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as one and the annuity payments would then be, in fact, derived solely from the
premiums paid for the annuity. The fact that the substance of the investment
could have been altered should not be allowed to distort what actually happened,
however.15 It was in this area that the Court relied rather heavily on form rather
than substance in reasoning that the annuity could normally have been acquired
separately. The practical result of surrendering the life insurance policies prior to
the death of the insured would be to eliminate the guarantee of the return of the
insured's initial premium investment. 16
When consideration is given to the federal income tax implications, the insur-
ance-annuity combination becomes even more attractive to the tax planner. The
income to the insured in these cases has been held to be taxable as an annuityT
rather than as interest as contended by the commissioner.' 8 The courts have thus
limited the taxable portion of the annual payments to the excess of the total
expected return on the annuity over the total cost pro-rated on an annual basis.
Heretofore, in the field of taxation, the courts have often stated that they will
look to substance rather than form or legal niceties of the art of conveyancing. 19
However, the principal case indicates that form can triumph over substance in
instances where there is a very delicate line of demarcation between the two. It
also points the way to substantial tax savings for individuals with enough cash and
longevity to profitably utilize the insurance-annuity combination as a tax planning
device.
John Convery
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: HEALTH AND HOUSING INSPECTION OF PRrVATE
HoMEs WITHOUT SEARCH WARRANTS
A man's home is his castle ... for where shall a man be safe if it be not in his house?
-Cokel
But Coke has been "overruled." A home is apparently no longer a castle in
Ohio where public officials may inspect private houses with no more documentary
authority than an identification card.
The ever increasing web of municipal police power ordinances relating to
health, safety, and fire protection has brought forth a controversy as to the scope
of a constitutional guaranty considered by the average American as basic.2 He
has, perhaps, taken it for granted too long for he may be losing it. The question is
this: Does the state or municipality have the power to enact and enforce a statute
that authorizes inspections of private homes without a search warrant or a court
order? The Supreme Court of Ohio in State ex rel. Eaton v. Price3 ruled that Ohio
municipalities do have such power.
Earl Taylor, a plumber residing in the city of Dayton, refused entrance into
15 Goldstone v. United States, 325 U.S. 687 (1945).
16 In the principal case, the cash surrender value at date of death was $326,000 or $24,000
less than face value.
17 INT. Rxv. CODE or 1954, § 72.
18 Helvering v. Meredith, 140 F.2d 973 (8th Cir. 1944) ; Commissioner v. Meyer, 139 F.2d
256 (6th Cir. 1943).
19 E.g. Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231, 234 (1931).
1 CoxE, ImsTrraTs III (1644).
2 Against unreasonable searches U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1958).
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his private dwelling house to city housing inspectors on three separate occasions.
The inspectors were making a house by house survey of the area. They called at
reasonable hours, but were unknown to Taylor and identified themselves only in
the usual way by quickly flashing an identification card. The householder informed
the inspectors in plain language that they had nothing in writing authorizing them
to come into his home and that there would be no inspection without a search
warrant.
Taylor soon found himself in jail charged with violating the city housing code.
4
Specifically, he was accused of denying free access to his home to the housing in-
spector. The ordinance authorizes and directs the city housing inspector to make
inspections to determine the conditions of dwellings within the city of Dayton. The
object of such inspections is stated to be the protection of the health and safety
of occupants and the general public. All owners and occupants must, under the
terms of the ordinance, allow the inspector free access to premises they control at
any reasonable hour.5
Conviction would impose upon Taylor penalties of a fine of not more than
$200.00 or thirty days in jail or both.6 A writ of habeas corpus served to release
the defendant from jail and upon later hearing the lower court allowed the writ.
The court found that the unlimited inspection statute was unconstitutional because
it offended the Ohio constitutional provision against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
7
The case was appealed by the Dayton City Attorney. Taylor lost his case in
the intermediate appellate court8 and also in the Supreme Court of Ohio.9 The
latter tribunal after a review of the cases concluded that:10
The right of a homeowner to the inviolability of his "castle" should be subordinate to
the general health and safety of the community where he lives. Certainly the ordinance
does not contemplate the invasion of the privacy of the home, and as applied to the
relator here, the record confirms the reasonableness of the Housing Inspector's actions.
This holding seems to be in direct conflict with the letter and the spirit of the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and its counterpart in state
constitutions." An examination of the intent behind the adoption of the basic
prohibition against unreasonable searches shows that the invasion of privacy of
the home was precisely the evil that was sought to be prevented. The provision
was made by men who feared a recurrence of the use of the infamous Writ of
Assistance. This instrument prior to 1776 was used to make searches of the
colonist's homes in efforts to enforce the customs laws. It did not need to be sup-
ported by any showing of probable cause. In actual practice, the King's officers
used it arbitrarily and vexatiously.' 2
4 DAYTON, Onio, CODE Or GEN. ORanmNACEs 18099 § 806-30 (1954). Enacted pursuant to
enabling legislation Om3o Rav. CODE § 715.26 (1953).
5 Ibid.
6 DAYTON, Ouro, CODE OF GEN. ORDiNqcEs 18099 § 806-83 (1953).
7 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14. A near duplicate of U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
8 State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 105 Ohio App. 376, 152 N.E.2d 776 (1957).
9 See note 3 supra.
10 168 Ohio St. at ...... 151 N.E.2d at 532.
"1Including California; CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 19. Another duplicate of U.S. CONsT.
amend. IV.
12 See James Otis' denunciation of the Writ of Assistance: II TnE WoRxs or JoHN AnAmS
523-25 (1850-56).
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The framers of the fourth amendment considered that the traditional common
law right of a citizen to be secure in his person and property, without a showing
of good cause for invasion, required clear and unequivocal protection. They desired
to preclude the use of unfettered governmental power to invade the homeowner's
privacy. Their quarrel was with the general warrant, under which a search might
be made with nothing but bare suspicion as basis for the intrusion. It was unen-
cumbered by limitations as to times, places, or frequency of search.
While there is a well established line of federal decisions interpreting the
fourth amendment as to unreasonable searches in purely criminal matters, the
federal courts have dealt with this precise question on but one occasion.
In District of Columbia v. Little,13 a health inspector acting upon a neighbor's
complaint was denied access to defendant's home. She simply stated that on con-
stitutional grounds she would not unlock the door. She was tried and convicted of
a misdemeanor in the municipal court for "hindering, obstructing and interfering
with the inspector in the performance of his duty."14
The District of Columbia Municipal Court of Appeals reversed and its judg-
ment was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
Circuit.' 5 A majority of the divided court found a paucity of cases on the inspec-
tion of private houses by such enforcement authorities. They reasoned that, if the
worst criminal could enjoy his privacy unless a judicial officer decided that prob-
able cause existed for an intrusion, certainly the average citizen should have no
less a right.
The dissent took the view that the right of the citizen to be protected against
unreasonable searches extends only to matters of a criminal nature; that an in-
spection under the police power for health and safety purposes is not the search
proscribed by the fourth amendment; and that for the enforcement of health and
safety codes "It has always been assumed that no search warrant is necessary."' 6
Somewhere in its argument, the dissent lost sight of the fact that violations
of the District of Columbia Health and Safety Ordinances are made misdemeanors
punishable by fines or imprisonment. They are therefore crimes. 17 In the second
place, the fourth amendment's protection does not end where crime is no longer
being investigated. On the contrary, where no crime is involved the amendment in
effect declares the principle that the citizen shall be secure in his home from gov-
ernmental interference. Crime is the only exception, and for crime the fourth
amendment provides the government with the search warrant remedy. To assume
that no search warrant is necessary for cases where no crime is involved but some
form of inspection is to be made is fallacious.' 8 In such cases the government must
bring a civil action and rely on discovery procedures. 19
The decision in the Little case is probably correct, since it recognizes the under-
lying purpose of the fourth amendment and refuses to curtail the protection it
affords to the citizen against the invasion of his privacy. Upon review by the
United States Supreme Court the Little case was affirmed, but the Court dodged
13 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
14 Administrative regulation promulgated by the commissioners of the District of Columbia
pursuant to authority granted by Congress. Act of Feb. 26, 1892, 27 Stat. 394 (1892).
15 See note 13 supra.
16 178 F.2d at 23.
17 BLAcx, LAW DIcnoxARY 444 (4th ed. 1951).
I8 A search warrant will not issue in civil cases. Robinson v. Richardson, 79 Mass.
(13 Gray) 454 (1859).
19 FED. R. Civ. P. 34; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2031.
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the constitutional issue and held simply that defendant's actions were not such
as could be construed to be an interference with an inspector in the performance
of his duty.2 0 There is consequently no Supreme Court interpretation of the fourth
amendment on this point.
2°a
Statutes which in effect confer the "general warrant" power on health and
safety inspectors are on the books in California and its municipalities.-" For in-
stance, San Francisco has a strictly written Municipal Code in which such pro-
visions appear in different chapters:
22
Right to Enter Buildings: Authorized employees of the city departments or city
agencies so far as may be necessary for the performance of their duties, shall, upon
presentation of proper credentials, have the right to enter at reasonable times any
building, structure or premises in the city to perform any duty imposed upon them
by the Municipal Code.
The Building Code, which is part of the San Francisco Municipal Code, has a
similar provision, supplemented by a section authorizing the Superintendent of
Public Works to secure police assistance in enforcing any part thereof. 23 Upon
being asked if the San Francisco building inspectors had a standard operating
procedure for effecting an inspection where entry was refused, an employee in the
Building Inspector's Office told this writer: "If they don't let us in, we just call a
cop." This procedure is apparently effective, but like many other effective actions
does not conform to our traditional ideals of individual rights.2
The constitutionality of these statutes has never been litigated in California.
But if the trend in municipal redevelopment and regulation continues in the direc-
tion of stricter enforcement of already strict codes, the case is certain to arise.
When this happens, the California courts will be faced with the same problem Ohio
had in State v. Price: a choice between upholding these statutes on the grounds
of police power or protecting individual civil liberties.
The argument in favor of unencumbered and almost unlimited inspection
powers of health and safety enforcement agencies is that without an adequate en-
forceabe inspection system no municipality can carry out programs for civic im-
provement. Urban redevelopment, slum clearance, rodent and disease control, and
slum prevention are admittedly desirable ends. 2 Propounders of this point of view
point out that were we to require a judicial order to permit inspection of private
homes by health and safety enforcement agencies, we would be imposing on the
judiciary the duties of administering such programs .2
It is submitted that health and safety enforcement will not likely suffer if the
constitutional civil liberties road is taken. While it is true that an adequate, sys-
20 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
2ot Since the printing of this note the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, has held that a
health inspector needs no warrant to make an inspection. Frank v. Maryland, 358 U.S..
(1959). For the reasons stated, the writer feels that this decision is erroneous.
21 CAL. HEALT
r 
A=D SAT CODE §§ 15270, 15272.
2 SAN FRANCISco, CAr,., Mu1zcIPAL CODE, part II, ch. XII, § 503 (1958).
2 SAw FRaNCisco, CAr.., MuNiciPAL CODE, part II, ch. I, §§ 801, 802 (1956).
2 4 Personnel in this office when asked if they had not thought that the householder might
have a constitutional right to the privacy of his home under the unreasonable search provision,
admitted that to them the idea was a novel proposition.
2 For a general discussion of municipal inspection practices and administration of anti-
slum programs see SIEGAL & BROOKS, SLUM- PEVzNTION THROUGHI CONSERVATION AND REHA-
BLITATIoN, a report submitted to the subcommittee on Urban Redevelopment, Rehabilitation
and Conservation of the President's Advisory Committee on Government Housing Policies and
Programs (Nov. 1953).2
6 See dissenting opinion of Holtzoff, J., 178 F.2d at 23.
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tematic inspection program is essential to the success of civic improvement, it need
not infringe on the occupant's right of privacy nor unduly burden the judiciary.
As a practical matter the inspector's access to private homes is quite broad. There
is no legal objection to his entry in an emergency. The health officer chasing the
rabid animal and the housing inspector surveying damage during a series of earth-
quakes have not time to procure authority to enter and need not do so.
2 7
We are concerned with the routine inspection. The homeowner is, in the first
instance, likely to give his consent to the routine inspection. Either he accepts the
inconvenience as a civic duty or feels that it is, like high taxes, a price that he
must pay for living in an urban community. The tenant is rather unlikely to resist
inspection. It is usually in his own interest to have the municipality require his
landlord to make necessary improvements in safety and sanitation.
The building being constructed or undergoing obvious repairs hardly ever poses
an inspection problem. The municipality generally requires a permit for such activ-
ity, express conditions of which include consent by the owner to inspection. If work
is being carried on without permit and can be seen from the street, no inspection
is necessary. Direct action may be taken against the owner administratively or
through the courts for failure to get the permit.m
Persons for whom an inspection is inconvenient at the moment will usually
agree to make arrangements for a later time if the inspecting personnel are reason-
able and considerate. Many objections of this type can be obviated by prior notice
to householders of areas to be inspected and a display of a general public relations
policy of service to the homeowner.
That the objector to inspection on constitutional grounds is a rarity is borne out
by the novelty of the problem and the scant authority on it. The fact is that most
occupants simply consent to inspection out of fear of entanglement in the munici-
pality's bureaucratic machine.
In any jurisdiction where health and housing codes declare their violations to
be crimes, the occasional constitutional objector can be easily confronted with
a search warrant. Most inspection situations provide the inspector with ample
grounds for swearing to the existence of probable cause to suspect code violations.
For example, the area might be designated officially as blighted or earmarked for
re-development; evidence of violations might be visible from the outside of the
structure; the age of the building might show that there is good reason to believe
it does not now conform to the codes; 2 9 or a complaint may have been lodged by a
neighbor as in the Little case. In all these situations the inspector can make short
work of obtaining a search warrant on his next trip to City Hall.
Apparently one of the very few serious problems that an enforcement agency
might face will be the refusal of access by a constitutional objector in a non-
blighted area, occupying premises that give no outward evidence of violation of
the health and safety codes and against whom no complaint has been lodged. In-
spectors would encounter such a person only in a systematic block by block, house
by house routine inspection as in the Price case. Here there is no right to make the
inspection. The federal and state constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable
searches should apply and a search warrant denied until there are reasonable
grounds to suspect code violations.
27 79 CJ.S., Searches and Seizures §8 (1952).
28 See, e.g., San Francisco Central Permit Bureau form F 435.
29 See Rau v. Redwood City Woman's Club, 111 Cal. App. 2d 546, 245 P.2d 12 (1952).
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